Abstract. The present survey reports on the state of the art of the different cryptographic functionalities built upon the ring learning with errors problem and its interplay with several classical problems in algebraic number theory. The survey is based to a certain extent on an invited course given by the author at the Basque Center for Applied Mathematics in September 2018.
Introduction
According to MIRACL Labs, it is estimated that a quantum computer capable of breaking most of modern cryptography will be built in the next 10-15 years (20-25 years according to Microsoft Research). All of cryptography is built on supposedly hard mathematical problems, most of which, like integer factorisation or the discrete logarithm problem, become relatively easy in the context of a working quantum computer. In response to this threat there is a need to migrate from these vulnerable constructs to constructs known to remain strong even in a post-quantum world.
An example of such a hard problem is the shortest vector problem in a lattice, which is known to be NP-hard. While there already exist post-quantum solutions for much of standard cryptography, like public key encryption and digital signature, it is currently unclear how some of the more elaborate protocols, like those seeking for integrity or non-repudiation can be successfully migrated. In particular in the last 10+ years bilinear pairings on elliptic curves have opened up many new possibilities, which will unfortunately be rendered insecure in a post-quantum world. Already commercial products based on bilinear pairings have found applications in the 'real world', and so much work must be done to ensure that we will be able to retain this functionality into the future.
At the same time there is much fundamental work to be done on the postquantum primitives themselves. Indeed an early decision is to choose between one or various of the following technologies, for each cryptographic feature: a) Code based cryptography ( [16] ) is built on the infeasibility of syndrome decoding for general linear error-correcting codes over finite fields.
b) Multivariate based cryptography ( [6] ) is a scheme based on the fact that solving general systems of multivariate polynomial equations over finite fields is proved to be NP-hard.
c) Isogeny based cryptography ( [9] ), is a protocol for key exchange, analogous to Diffie-Hellman, but the cyclic groups present here are attached to supersingular elliptic curves defined over finite field.
d) Finally, lattice based cryptography, admits a large number of different formulations and constructions. This report focuses on one of the most promising lattice-based technologies: Ring Learning With Errors (RLWE). This scheme is based on the RLWE problem, which is based in turn on the difficulty of solving the shortest vector problem (SVP) on ideal lattices.
At the time of writing, code, lattice and multivariate-based methods seem to be the strongest contenders, as they appear to have the flexible structure needed on which to base more complex protocols. Within these three categories, the lattice-based one has by far a larger number of non-broken primitives/protocols. Lattice based cryptography has a relatively mature history, primarily due to the work done by the early proponents of the related NTRU cryptosystem ( [12] ). This was a patented technology which enjoyed some minor success, but never really gained traction, as when it was invented, a quantum computer still seemed very far off. Its patents have now expired.
RLWE first came to prominence with the paper by Lyubashevsky, Peikert and Regev ([14] ). A key-exchange algorithm proposed by them was recently optimized and implemented by Alkim, Ducas, Pöppelmann, and Schwabe ( [1] ). This was then implemented by Google in a well-publicised experiment ( [3] ). In recent times there have been many implementation improvements, see for example the recent paper by Scott ([20] ). So there can be no doubting the practicality of the technology, opinions supporting this view include those of a good number of researchers in Intel Labs and MIRACL Labs.
RLWE is built on an earlier scheme: the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem, which admits a security reduction from the SVP on arbitrary lattices, proved to be NP-hard. The disadvantage is a quadratic overhead in the key sizes, which is unfeasible in practice but is overcome in the RLWE scenario, at the cost of being backed in the SVP over just ideal lattices, which even if based on experience is widely believed to be intractable, there is no proof of it at the moment. In spite of that, RLWE variant appears to be eminently practical. While, in common with most post-quantum proposals, the key sizes are much larger than those of existing methods, they often require much less computing power. For example while an elliptic curve based cryptosystem might use keys of 256 bits, an equivalent system based on RLWE might require keys of 4096 bits, while running maybe 10-100 times faster ( [13] ). These differences might be seen as balancing each other out. Likewise, 30% of the surviving proposals for the NIST are based of RLWE.
Our report is structured as follows:
In section 2 we provide a quick introduction to the different funtionalities of cryptography and introduce the main terms and facts on complexity as they show up in the literature. We provide several examples, elaborating on those presented in the course by the author.
In section 3 we expose the main concepts of lattice-based cryptography. We focus on the classical LWE, over which RLWE is built and discuss its advanteges and drawbacks.
Section 4 is an quick overview of a few key concepts in algebraic number theory: rings of integers, canonical embedding, and other topics. These pieces will make the foundations of RLWE, but the reader who is familiar with this material can safely skip it.
Section 5 introduces the RLWE problem in its various formulations and reports on several attacks to the scheme, which motivate some number theoretical problems and conjectures. Section 6 addresses RLWE-based digital signatures and homomorphic encryption, a functionality which is gaining much interest today, since it allows to solve a good number of logistic and security problems in cloud computing and storing. We close the survey by discussing in detail some NIST figures.
A couple of remarks to end this introduction: first, by a polynomial time algorithm we mean an algorithm for which there exists a polynomial p(x) ∈ R[x] and a size function of the family of the algorithm inputs x(n), such that the time it takes to run the algorithm on input n is p(x(n)). Second, we will use sometimes theÕ-notation: a function f (x) isÕ(g(x)) if it is O(g(x)log k (x)) for some k.
Acknowledgements: The author thanks Gary McGuire for carefully reading a preliminary version of this survey, to Mike Scott for providing most of the practical highlights on RLWE and to the Basque Center for Applied Mathematics for their invitation to give this course. Active and insightful discussion with the audience of the course, and in particular with Sebastiá Xambó set the author to write this work.
2. Post-quantum cryptography 2.1. Cryptography features. Requirements such as confidentiality and proofs of identity are crucial in electronic financial and legal transactions, while some other features like non-repudiation or operating on encrypted data (homomorphic encryption) are gaining much traction within the last few years. We examine here most of these functionalities.
The best known cryptographic problem is confidentiality. This is attained by the use of well-designed encryption/decription schemes.
To start with, we fix a finite alphabet A, with some methematical structure such as an abelian group or a field (e.g. the finite field F q for q = p t and p prime, or an elliptic curve over this field). We consider three sets K ⊂ A n (keys), M ⊂ A N (plaintexts) and C ⊂ A N (ciphertexts) with n ≪ N . Finally, we consider a set Λ ⊂ N which parametrizes the level of security, i.e., the larger λ ∈ Λ, the safer the scheme.
Definition 2.1 (Cipher schemes). A cipher over (K, M, C) is a family of pairs of efficiently computable functions {(E λ , D λ )} λ∈Λ where for each λ, E λ : K×M → C (encryption function) and D λ : K × C → M (decryption function) are such that for each key k ∈ K and for each plaintext m ∈ M, the following correctness property holds:
That is to say, decryption undoes encryption.
Efficiently computable means that both E λ and D λ can be computed by an algorithm which is polynomial in the security parameter λ, i.e., there exist polynomials p(x), q(x) ∈ R[x] only depending on the scheme, such that for each λ ∈ Λ, k ∈ K, m ∈ M, and c ∈ C, the number of steps to compute E λ (k, m) (resp. D λ (k, c)) is upper bounded by p(λ) (resp. q(λ)). Moreover, the algorithm for E λ can be probabilistic, while D λ should always be deterministic.
Since in our definition both the encryption and decryption parties have the same key (i.e., the scheme is symmetric), they should agree beforehand on that key somehow. For instance, they might do it physically in a secret meeting but they can also use a digital key exchange protocol. As usual, any arbitrary legitimate sender (receiver) will be called Alice (Bob), and any arbitrary eavesdropper will be called Eve.
Definition 2.2 (Key exchange protocol)
. A key exchange protocol is an efficient method for Alice and Bob to agree on a key through a (potentially non-safe) channel. One of the most famous protocols is Diffie-Hellman's (DH), where Alice and Bob start by agreeing on a finite feld F q and a primitive root g, made public. To agree on a private key, Alice selects an integer a and Bob selects an integer b. Then, Alice sends g a to Bob, who on receiving it, raises it to b modulo q, getting g ab . Next, Bob sends g b to Alice, who raises it to a, obtaining also g ab , the agreed private key.
Notice that without knowledge of a or b, Eve cannot obtain g ab from g a and g b in an efficient manner (on a classic computer!), the obtruction being the unfeasibility of the discrete logarithm, namely, to obtain a from g a modulo q, if g is known. Nowadays, a combined usage of Diffie-Hellman (or some variant) with a suitable symmetric cipher is used in most internet protocols, like TLS or TCP/IP. A variant of DH is ECDH, where the multiplicative group F * q is replaced by the additive group of an elliptic curve over F q .
Definition 2.3 (Digital signatures).
A signature scheme is a pair (G, D), where G : Λ → K is an efficient key generating probabilistic algorithm, and D = {(S λ , V λ )} λ∈Λ is a family of pairs of polynomial-random-algorithm-computable functions S λ : K × M → T ⊆ A r (space of tags) and V λ : K × M × T → {0, 1} such that whenever k s (secret key) and k p (public key) are sampled from G on security level λ, it is, for every message m ∈ M:
For a security level λ, S λ is called the signature function and V λ the verification function, which returns 1 if the signature is valid and 0 otherwise. This scheme provides a proof that the message was created by a known sender (authentication) and the sender cannot deny having sent the message (non-repudiation).
Integrated Encryption Schemes implement both encryption and authentication. Two of the most commonly used are ECIES, which operates with elliptic curves and DLIES, which operates over F q . where M and C are abelian groups under the operations * M and * C respectively. The cipher is said to be homomorphic if for each key k ∈ K and plaintexts m 1 , m 2 ∈ M, it is
Example 2.6. RSA encryption is homomorphic. Indeed, for an RSA integer N = pq > 1 and an exponent e modulo φ(N ) with inverse d, encryption goes as x → x e (mod N ), which clearly commutes with the product modulo N , but not with the sum.
When in addition, M and C have ring structure and encryption commutes with both ring operations, the cipher is said to be fully homomorphic (FHE). Notice that RSA is not fully homomorphic.
Homomorphic encryption allows to perform operations on the plaintext by operating directly on the ciphertexts, i.e., without decrypting first. This is relevant when the operations are outsourced and performed over a non-trustable server. Applications of homomorphic encryption include encrypted database queries, cloud computing, genetic computing, health data management or outsourced generation of blockchain addresses.
2.2. P, NP, NP-hard and NP-complete. The author has often seen that the terms intractable, unfeasible, and hard, are used in the post-quantum cryptography literature in a rather loose (at best!) manner and this may lead to believe that certain computational problems enjoy certain complexity guarantees that they simply have not. We make here precise the main terms that will appear in the problems which back lattice cryptography. Definition 2.7 (The P and NP classes). The P class consists of the decission problems whose solution can be found on a deterministic Turing machine in polynomial time in the input size. The NP class consists of the decission problems for which a putative solution can be checked to be a real solution or not in polynomial time on a determnistic Turing machine.
Equivalently, the NP-class consists of the decission problems such that a solution can be found in polynomial time on a non-deterministic Turing machine. A common misconception is that the NP term in NP-hard stands for non-polynomial when in fact it stands for non-deterministic polynomial acceptable problems.
Definition 2.8 (reduction)
. We say that a problem A admits a reduction to a problem B if any instance of A can be transformed to an instance of B in polynomial time, namely, if solving B suffices for solving A.
Informally, NP-hard and NP-complete problems are those at least as hard as those in the NP-class, but while NP-complete problems belong to NP, NP-hard ones need not to, hence NP-hard problems can be regarded as more intractable than NP-complete ones. More precisely:
Definition 2.9. The NP-hard class consists of those problems A such that every problem in NP can be reduced to A in polynomial time. The NP-complete class consists of those NP problems which are NP-hard.
Example 2.10. In a major breakthrough, Agrawal, Kayal and Saxena proved that primality testing, i.e., deciding whether a positive integer is prime or not is a P problem.
More relevant to cryptographers, the celebrated Shor's algorithm solves the factoring problem (i.e. finds the prime factorisation of a positive integer) in polynomial time on a quantum computer. This does not mean that this problem is in the P-class, as a (probabilistic) quantum algorithm is not equivalent, in general, to a Turing or sequential machine. On the other hand, the prime factorsation problem is clearly NP: checking if a putative solution (i.e. a prime decomposition) is a prime factorisation of an integer can be done in (deterministic) polynomial time. However it is not known if prime factorisation is NP-hard (and hence NPcomplete). It is expected, moreover, not to be in the P class, but as pointed out before, it can be carried out, with arbitrarily high probability, on a quantum computer.
To factor a positive integer N , Shor's algorithm runs over all the integers in the range {1, .., N }. For 1 < a < N , if a is a unit modulo N , the algorithm calls a sub-routine to compute the order of a modulo N . With this period, the algorithm produces a non-trivial factor of N .
The period-finding sub-routine is run on a quantum computer, but the use of the period to produce a factor is classical.
Example 2.11. There is a polynomial time quantum reduction from the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) to the the order-finding problem.
Indeed, given A = g a (mod N ), use the polynomial time quantum sub-routine in Shor's algorithm to find r, the order of A. Second, use Shor's algorithm to find φ(N ). So, a quantum computer would render insecure protocols as RSA and DiffieHellman. Even more, Tate and Weil's pairings allow to reduce ECDLP to DLP, hence, symmetric cryptography based on elliptic curves would also be broken in a post-quantum scenario. This is a reason to consider schemes which use pairingfree abelian varieties, hence other than elliptic curves. Jacobians of hyperelliptic curves are known to be good candidates but beyond genus 3, the complexity of finding explicit equations and explicit computations for the addition law render them unfeasible.
On the other hand, NP-complete problems are not expected to be solvable even in a quantum compute, hence NP-hard are neither. However, this is only conjectural.
Another well-known conjecture is whether P = N P or not. If equality held, all cryptographic (classic and postquantum) primitives based on NP-complete problems (which are, in particular, NP problems, hence P problems, by the assumed equality) would be useless. On the contrary, if, as it is widely believed, P = N P , then every NP-hard problem would be non-polynomial, hence suitable for cryptography: indeed, if Λ is NP-hard, in case P = N P , take B in N P \ P . Then Λ cannot be polynomial (otherwise, B would be so).
But for the moment, lacking a proof of P = N P , all we can say is that NP-hard problems are strongly expected to be suitable for (postquantum) cryptography.
Lattice based cryptography
The security of lattice-based schemes relies on two NP-hard problems, which are expected to be intractable on a quantum computer, and which we explain next. By length, we mean Euclidean length, denoted || ||. By a lattice we understand, from now on, a finitely generated additive subgroup of R n . When the rank of a finitely generated abelian group is n, the lattice is said to have full rank.
Problem 3.1 (SVP). Let Λ be a full rank lattice in R n and denote by λ 1 (Λ) the length of the shortest non-zero vector. The shortest vector problem (SVP) is to determine a vector x ∈ Λ with length λ 1 (Λ). For γ > 0, the γ-approximate shortest vector problem (γ-SVP) is to determine a non-zero vector x ∈ Λ with length smaller than γλ 1 (Λ).
Problem 3.2 (CVP)
. Let Λ be a full rank lattice in R n . The closest vector problem (CVP) consists in, given y ∈ R n , to find x y ∈ Λ such that ||y − x y || = min x∈Λ ||x − y||.
If Λ is an arbitrary lattice, i.e., if no extra condition is imposed on it, in [2] (resp. in [15] ) it is proved that CVP (resp. SVP) is NP-hard. Hence, if P = N P , these two problems cannot be solved in polynomial time, even with the aid of a quantum computer.
Learning with errors (LWE).
Let q be a rational prime for which a suitable choice will be made later. A provably quantum-secure instantiation of lattice-based cryptography relies on the LWE problem, which we describe in this subsection.
Definition 3.3 (LWE-oracles)
. Let χ be a discrete random variable χ with values over F q . For s ∈ F n q , chosen uniformly at random, a LWE-oracle with respect to s and χ, denoted A χ,s , is a probabilistic algorithm A s,χ which, at each execution, performs the following steps:
1. Samples a vector a uniformly at random from F n q . 2. Computes the scalar product a, s . 3. Samples e ∈ F q from χ. 4. Outputs the vector [a, a, s + e] ∈ F n q × F q .
Definition 3.4 (The LWE problem). Let χ be a discrete random variable with values in F q as before. The LWE problem for χ and q is defined as follows: a) Search version: for an element s ∈ F n q chosen uniformly at random and a LWE-oracle A s,χ , if an adversary is given access to arbitrarily many samples [a, a, s + e] of the LWE distribution, this adversary must recover s. a) Decisional version: for an element s ∈ F n q chosen uniformly at random and a LWE oracle A s,χ , the adversary is asked to distinguish, with nonnegligible advantage, between arbitrarily many samples from A s,χ and the same number of samples (a i , b i ) ∈ F n q × F q where a i and b i are chosen independently and uniformly at random from F n q and F q .
From now on, χ will be a discrete Gaussian variable values on F q , which is defined as follows: For σ, c ∈ R we set ρ σ,c (x) = exp
and define D σ,c to be the distribution on Z such that the probability of x ∈ Z is ρ σ,c (x)/S σ,c . Finally, the discrete Gaussian distribution χ with values in F q , mean 0, and parameter σ is defined by the probability function
Some words of caution: first, the variance of χ is close to σ 2 , but is not exactly σ 2 , in lattice-based cryptography what is relevant is the parameter σ, rather than the variance. Second, the discrete Gaussian over Z is more complicated than truncating a continuous Gaussian to its closest integer. Effective sampling from discrete Gaussian distributions is a major topic and in practical cases it is approached only by numerical approximation. The reader is referred to [7] for a formal discussion as well as for generalisations to lattices in R n , which will be used in next chapters.
In the Machine Learning terminology, an algorithm which solves the search version of LWE is a training algorithm using the collection of LWE samples as a training set. On the other hand, Regev found in [18] a polynomial time quantum reduction from the SVP problem to the LWE problem. This means that a training algorithm A for the LWE problem can be turned, in polynomial time (on a quantum computer), into an algorithm B (of the same complexity as A) which solves the SVP problem. Since we have seen before that the SVP problem is NP-hard, it follows that the LWE problem is also NP-hard.
Based on this hardness guarantee, the LWE problem can be used to build the following cryptosystem:
1. Parameters: n, m ∈ N, α > 0. 2. Private key: s ∈ F n q chosen uniformly at random. 3. Public key:
3.1 Sample a 1 , ..., a m ∈ F n q , independently and uniformly at random. 3.2 Sample e 1 , ..., e m ∈ F q , independently from χ, which is assumed here to be a discrete Gaussian of zero mean and parameter
. 4. Encryption: for a bit z ∈ F 2 , consider it as an element of F q by mapping the 0 and 1 of F 2 to the 0 and 1 of F q . Select a random subset S ⊆ {1, ..., m} and map
Decryption
The right choice of q, m and α is given in the following result, whose proof is omited since it is very similar to the cryptographic scheme presented in the next subsection, whose proof we provide.
and m is of the order of 1.1n log(q), then the LWE cryptosystem is correct and pseudorandom.
As we can see, a public key for LWE has m vectors in F n q , since m is of the order of n log(n), it turns out that a public key has an F q -size of the order n 2 log(n). This quadratic overhead is an unfeasible constrain from a practical point of view, in particular in settings such as hand-held digital broadcasting, mobile encryption and small devices in future applications of the IoT (Internet of Things), where the hardware has a relatively small memory. A variation of the LWE problem, the ring learning with errors (RLWE) problem was introduced to tackle this quadratic overhead. The foundations of the problem require several notions from algebraic number theory, which we present next.
Some basics of algebraic number theory
Here we present the notions of algebraic number theory used to build the RLWE cryptosystem. Readers who are familiar with them can easily skip this section, while readers who are not are referred to [21] , Chapter 2 for more details.
Algebraic number fields.
A number field is a field extension K = Q(θ)/Q of finite degree n, where θ satisfies a relation f (θ) = 0 for some irreducible polynomial f (x) ∈ Q[x], which is monic without loss of generality. The polynomial f is called the minimal polynomial of θ, and n is also the degree of f . Notice that K is in particular an n-dimensional Q-vector space and the set {1, θ, ..., θ n−1 } is a Q-basis of K called the power basis. Notice that associating θ with the indeterminate x yields a natural isomorphism between K and Q[x]/f (x).
I.e. statistically indistinguishable from a uniform distribution A number field K = Q(θ) of degree n has exactly n field embeddings (injective field homomorphisms) fixing the base field Q, which we denote σ i : K → C. These embeddings map θ to each of the complex roots of its minimal polynomial f . An embedding whose image lies in R(corresponding to (σ 1 (x) , ..., σ n (x)). Note that σ is a field homomorphism from K to R s 1 × C 2s 2 , where multiplication and addition in the latter are both component-wise.
Algebraic integers.
An algebraic integer is an element whose minimal polynomial over Q has integer coefficients. For a number field K of degree n, let O K ⊂ K denote the set of all algebraic integers in K. This set forms a ring (under addition and multiplication in K), called the ring of integers of K. It happens that O K is a free Z-module of rank n, i.e., it is the set of all Z-linear combinations of some basis B = {b 1 , ..., b n } ⊂ O K of K. Such a set B is called an integral basis. 
where {θ 1 , ...θ n } is a Z-basis of O K . Notice that since lattice base-change matrices are unimodular, the definition does not depend on the choice of the basis.
Ideals and ideal lattices.
Recall that an ideal of a ring R is an additive subgroup I ⊆ R such that for each α ∈ R and each β ∈ I, it is αβ ∈ I.
For instance, for d ≡ 1 (mod 4), the subring
is not an ideal of the ring of integers, just a subring with finite index.
If R is discrete, for an embedding σ : R → R n , σ(R) is a lattice. An ideal lattice for the pair (R, σ) is the image σ(I) for I an ideal of R. When R = O K for a number field K of degree n, the canonical embedding σ provides in a natural way an ideal lattice for each ideal I of R. Notice that the square root of ∆ K is the volume of the fundamental parallelogram of the lattice σ(O K ). From now on, by ideal embeddings we will mean with respect to the canonical embedding.
Notice that for the canonical embedding, multiplication and addition are preserved component-wise. For instance, for the ring Z[x]/(x n + 1), the coordinate embedding does not preserve addition and multiplication component-wise: multiplying by x, for instance, is equivalent to shifting the coordinates and negate the independent term. This is one of the advantages of using the canonical embedding.
Ring learning with errors in its several variants

Statement of the problems.
To define the ring learning with errors (RLWE) problem, let K be a number field of degree n and ring of integers O K . By using the canonical embedding we can regard it as a full rank lattice.
A closely related (and equivalent under some conditions) problem is the polynomial learning with errors problem (PLWE). To define it, we start with a monic irreducible polynomial f (x) ∈ Z[x] and consider the ring Z[x]/(f (x)). Notice that the polynomial defines a number field K α = Q(α) for each root α of f (x) and all of them are Q-isomorphic. Moreover, the ring Z[α] is a finite-index sub-order of the ring of integers O Kα . The restriction of the canonical embedding to this suborder provides also a lattice. A very common choice is f (x) = x n + 1, where n = 2 k , which is the 2 k+1 -th cyclotomic polynomial.
Let q be a rational prime which we will choose later.
Definition 5.1 (RLWE and PLWE-oracles).
1. Set R = O K and R q = R/qR. Fix also a discrete random variable χ with values in R. For s ∈ R q , chosen uniformly at random, a RLWE-oracle with respect to s and χ is a probabilistic algorithm A s,χ which, at each execution performs the following steps:
1. Samples an element a ∈ R q uniformly at random, 2. Samples an element e from χ and computesẽ := e (mod qR q ), 3. Outputs the pair (a, as +ẽ) ∈ R q × R q . 2. For a monic irreducible polynomial f ∈ Z[x], set R = Z[x]/(f (x)) and R q = R/qR. Fix also a discrete random variable χ with values in R. For s ∈ R q , chosen uniformly at random, a PLWE-oracle with respect to s and χ is a probabilistic algorithm A s,χ which, does exactly the same steps as an RLWE-oracle, but with the difference that R q is now a quotient polynomial ring instead of the quotient of a ring of integers.
Definition 5.2 (The RLWE problem). Set R = O K and R q = R/qR as before. Let χ be a discrete random variable with values in R. The RLWE-problem for χ is defined as follows: a) Search version: for an element s ∈ R q chosen uniformly at random and a RLWE-oracle A s,χ , if an adversary is given access to arbitrarily many samples (a i , a i s +ẽ i ) of the RLWE distribution, this adversary must recover s. a) Decisional version: for an element s ∈ R chosen uniformly at random and a RLWE-oracle A s,χ , the adversary is asked to distinguish, with nonnegligible advantage, between arbitrarily many samples from A s,χ and the same number of samples (a i , b i ) where a i , b i are chosen uniformly at randon from R q .
If we set R = Z[x]/(f (x)) instead of O K , we have the analogous definitions for the PLWE problem in its search and decisional versions.
Some words on the class of distributions we will use from now on. Notice that one RLW E sample is an n-tuple of coordinates with values in F q , but it is something more than n LWE samples (R q is not only an F q -vector space, but has also a ring structure). This is the reason why instead of taking n-independent discrete F q -valued Gaussians, we rather use an F n q -valued Gaussian. As in the 1-dimensional case, the mean will also be 0 and the variance-covariance matrix (or rather, the multidmensional parameter) will be chosen to be diagonal (which is referred to as saying that the distribution is elliptic). This is useful when carrying out the security-reduction proofs. Moreover, it is enough for most of the proofs to assume that the diagonal elements of the covariance matrix are bounded in absolute value by αn 1/4 , for α a parameter which will be made explicit in the next theorem. Hence, from now on, we assume that χ α is an elliptic ndimensional Gaussian of 0-mean and the elements of the diagonal are bounded as explained. The details are delicate and can be omited in a first study, since the aforementioned bound is what really matters for most proofs, but the reader is referred to [14] , p. 19 for more information.
The next result backs the security of the decisional RLWE-problem (hence of the search RLWE-problem) in the security of the SVP over ideal lattices.
Theorem 5.3 ([14], page 19).
Let K be the m-th cyclotomic number field of degree n = φ(m) and R = O K its ring of integers. Let α < log n/n and let q = q(n) ≥ 2, q ≡ 1 (mod m) be a prime bounded by a polynomial in n such that αq ≥ ω( √ log n). There is a polynomial time quantum reduction fromÕ( √ n/α)-SVP on ideal lattices of K to the decisional RLWE problem for K and χ α .
The proof consists of two parts: the first is a quantum reduction from worst case approximate SVP on ideal lattices to the search version of RLWE. The reduction works in general, not for just cyclotomic number fields. It uses the iterative quantum reduction for general lattices in [18] as a black box, the main effort being the classical (non-quantum) part, which requires a careful handling of the canonical embedding and the Chinese Remainder Theorem.
The second part shows that the RLWE distribution is pseudorandom via a classical reduction from the search version, which has been shown hard in the first part. It uses the fact that the cyclotomic field is Galois and the fact that q ≡ 1 (mod n), which ensures that the ideal qR splits totally into n ideals in R.
In [17] Theorem 6.2, the authors build on the same number-theoretical kind of arguments as in [14] to prove an analogue of 5.3 for non-cyclotomic Galois number fields.
As pointed out before, for the cyclotomic number field, the ring of integers satisfies O K = Z[ζ], with ζ a primitivee m-th root of unity. Since this ring is isomorphic to Z[x]/(Φ m (x)), with Φ m (x) the m-th cyclotomic polynomial, it easily follows that both the RLWE and PLWE problems are equivalent each other. For number fields other than cyclotomic, all we can say at the time of writing is the following:
There is a polynomial quantum reduction algorithm from decision (resp search) RLWE in K to decision (resp. search) PLWE for f (x), where K is the splitting field of f (x), for an infinite family of polynomials, in particular for the family x n + xp(x) − r where n ≥ 1, p(x) runs over polynomials with deg(p(x)) < n/2 and r runs over primes such that 25||p|| 2 1 ≤ r ≤ s(n), with s(x) a polynomial. Notice that there is a trivial reduction from PLWE to RLWE.
To close the picture, the following result is also true:
Theorem 5.5 ( [19] ). For an arbitrary Galois number field K, there is a quantum reduction algorithm from search RLWE in K to decision RLWE.
The LPR (Lyubashevsky, Peikert and Regev) RLWE-cryptosystem.
Both RLWE and PLWE problems can be turned into public key cryptosystems, as we show next. We will focus in the PLWE version, which is more suitable for computer implementations, i.e., we will set R = Z[x]/(f (x)) for a monic irreducible f (x) ∈ Z[x] and q a prime. Notice that the ring R q is, as a ring, isomorphic to F t q for suitable t depending on the splitting type of of q in the corresponding ring of integers.
As said in the former subsection, the parameter of χ α is upper bounded entrywise by αn 1/4 , and α is chosen to be less than log(n) n and q = q(n) as in 5.3. Take n big enough so that the variance of χ α is close enough to its parameter and such that 3log(n) √ n < q 4 (this will be used to grant the correctness of the cryptosystem).
Construction 5.6 (The RLWE cryptosystem).
1. Key generation: choose a ∈ R q uniformly at random and choose s, e sampled from χ and reduced modulo q. The secret key will be s and the public key will be the pair (a, b = as + e). 2. Encryption: take a plaintext z consisting of a stream of bits and regard it as a polynomial in R q , mapping each bit to a coefficient, say, z ∈ R q . Choose r, e 1 , e 2 sampled from χ and reduced modulo q. Set u = ar + e 1 and v = br + e 2 + ⌊ q 2 ⌋z. 3. Decryption: Perform v−us = er+e 2 −e 1 s+⌊ q 2 ⌋z and round the coefficients either to zero or to ⌊ q 2 ⌋, whichever is closest mod q.
Proposition 5.7. The PLWE cryptosystem is correct (i.e. decryption undoes encryption) and pseudorandom.
Proof. For correctness, notice that for the chosen values of α, q and n, with arbitrarily large probability, the value er + e 2 − e 1 s will have magnitude less than
, the 1-norm is defined as ||p||1 = n i=0 |pi| 3 log(n)q/n < q/4, so the bits of z can be recovered by dividing v − us by ⌊q/2⌋, dismissing the reminder, and decrypting, bit by bit, to this quotient.
For pseudorandomness, first note that RLWE samples are pseudorandom even when s is sampled from χ α , by a transformation to the Hermite normal form. Therefore, public keys (a, b) are pseudorandom and we can replace them by a uniform pair in R 2 q . The observations of a passive adversary are (a, u) and (b, v) which are also pseudorandom, since r is also sampled from χ α .
Attacks on RLWE.
A detailed report on the state of the art of attacks on the RLWE cryptosystem can be found in [8] , where the authors discuss a list of open questions in algebraic number theory motivated by this cryptosystem. This interplay between applied and pure number theory constitutes a fruitful link which is expected to motivate a flow of results from each direction to the other. We present here only a few of these attacks and questions, working out some details. Within this subsection, we assume that K is a number field of degree n, and in the PLWE setting, that the defining polynomial f (x) splits totally over F q [x] . This is unnecessary but it will simplify the exposition, while keeping the essential facts.
A first fact to mention is that at the time of writing, there is no direct attack against RLWE, i.e., without a reduction to an attack on PLWE, other than general attacks against arbitrary lattices , using bounded distance decoders. This topic is under research by the author of this survey. So, all the attacks presented here attemp at breaking PLWE first and then to reduce RLWE to PLWE.
Theorem 5.8 (Elias et al. [8] ). If K satisfies the following six conditions, there is a polynomial time attack to the search version of the associated RLWE scheme:
The transformation between the canonical embedding of K and the power basis representation of K is given by a scaled orthogonal matrix. 5. If f is the minimal polynomial of β, then f (1) ≡ 0 (mod q) . 6. The prime q can be chosen suitably large.
The first two conditions are sufficient for the RLWE search-to-decision reduction in the case where
, which is implied by the third condition. The third and fourth conditions are sufficient for the RLWE-to-PLWE reduction; and the last two conditions are sufficient for the attack on PLWE. Unfortunately (for the attacker's point of view), it is difficult to construct number fields satisfying all six conditions simultaneously.
Next, we explain the attack on PLWE if 5 and 6 hold.
Setting as usual R = Z[x]/(f (x)) and R q = R/qR, fix a public key (a(x), b(x)) ∈ R q × R q and a secret key s(x) ∈ R q , i.e b(x) = a(x)s(x) + e(x) with e(x) sampled from the discrete Gaussian and reduced modulo q.
For each root α ∈ F q of f (x), consider the projection π α : R q → F q given by p(x) → p(α). By short vector in R q we refer to those with small coefficients, which in practice means that these are upper bounded, in absolute value, by q/4. For suitable parameter, these short vectors lie inside a prescribed region with non-negligible probability and are easy to recognise. However, for a pair (a(x), b(x)), it is difficult to check if it exists r(x) and a short vector e(x) such that b(x) = a(x)r(x) + e(x), in which case the attacker would guess that s(x) = r(x). The reason is that there are q n possibilities for s(x) to test, which is prohibitive.
By contrast, in a small ring like F q , it is easy to examine the possibilities for s(α) exhaustively: we can loop through the possibilities for s(α), obtaining for each the putative value e(α) = b(α)−a(α)s(α). The Decision Problem for PLWE, then, is solved as soon as we can recognize the set of e(α) that arise from the Gaussian with high probability.
Again, this is difficult in general, but if 5 holds, i.e., if α = 1 is a root of f (x), the attacker has a chance:
Let us denote by S ⊆ R q the subset of polynomials that are produced by the Gaussian with non-negligible probability. This is a small set, due to the parameter choice. However, F q is also a much smaller set than R q and one expects that generically, π α (S) = F q or something very close. One says that in this case S smears across all of F q .
But we are supposing that α = 1. The polynomials g(x) ∈ S have small coefficients, and hence have small images g(1) ∈ F q . This is simply because n is much smaller than q, due to 6, so that the sum of n small coefficients is still small modulo q.These ideas can be turned into the following algorithm:
, where each sample is drawn either uniformly at random or from the PLWE distribution . The output is to decide, for each sample, from which distribution is taken, with non-negligible probability. The algorithm is as follows: Set S = F q ; This is the first guess for π 1 (S), which will be updated after each iteration.
2 For each s ∈ S do 2.1 Compute e i := b i (1) − sa i (1); 2.2 If e i is not small in absolute value modulo q, then conclude that the sample cannot be valid for s with nonnegligible probability, and update S = S \ {s}; Next s; 3 If S = ∅, conclude that the sample was random, otherwise declare the sample as valid; Next i; e ij , and if σ is the variance of χ (which is spherical with respect to our embedding, fixed beforehand), then, e i is sampled from a discrete Gaussian distribution of zero mean and parameter √ nσ. The region of non-negligible probability for this Gaussian, say, nσ 2 ≪ q makes a sensible guess for the set S.
Notice that the cyclotomic cases are protected against this attack: α = 1 is never a root modulo q of a cyclotomic polynomial of degree greater than 1 when q is sufficiently large. However, with minor modifications, it is possible to extend the former attack to the case where α small order modulo q. Indeed, denote by r the order of α modulo q. For a polynomial e(x), to decide if e(α) is sampled from a Gaussian distribution in a similar fashion as in Remark 5.10 is more complicated. However, one can still take advantage of a small r, as we explain next. e jr+i α i .
If e(x) is sampled from a Gaussian with variance σ 2 , then each term M j=0 e jr+i is sampled from a 1-dmensional Gaussian of variance (M + 1)σ 2 . This defines a smallness region Λ ⊂ F q to look at in order to guess tentative values of π α (e(x)). With this observation, we can derive the following algorithm:
, where each sample is drawn either uniformly at random or from the PLWE distribution . The output is to decide, for each sample, from which distribution is taken, with non-negligible probability. The algorithm is as follows:
2 If e i ∈ Λ, then conclude that the sample cannot be valid for s with nonnegligible probability, and update S = S \ {s}; Next s; 3 If S = ∅, conclude that the sample was random, otherwise declare the sample as valid; Next i;
5.4.
Some number theoretical open questions motivated by attacks on PLWE. As seen before, being simultaneously Galois and monogenic, having α = 1 as a root of the minimal polynomial modulo q (or some other root of small order) and the non-smearing under the evaluation map π α of the set of small vecotrs in P q can be regarded as weakness conditions to build a RLWE-based cryptosystem. We give next a list of number theoretical problems which are motivated by the search of security in RLWE-based primitives and are still open, up to date.
Question 5.12. Are there fields of cryptographic size (i.e. n ≥ 2 10 ) which are Galois and monogenic, other than the cyclotomic number fields and their maximal real subfields? How can one construct such fields explicitly? Is it possible to test algorithmically both features?
Notice that for fields of cryptographic size, the discriminant is too big to test whether or not it is square free, hence to decide if it is monogenic. An algorithmic approach which circumvects this testing is not available at the time of writing. Although for fields of small degree, a complete characterisation may be feasible (sufficient and necessary conditions for a cubic number field have been found by Gras and Archinard), the situation is much different for large degree fields. For instance, cyclic extensions tend to be non-monogenic: Theorem 5.13. Any cyclic extension K of prime degree n ≥ 5 is non-monogenic except for the maximal real subfield of the (2l + 1)-th cyclotomic field.
Another result in this direction is as follows:
Theorem 5.14. Let n ≥5 be relatively prime to 2, 3. There are only finitely many abelian number fields of degree n that are monogenic.
Question 5.15. Let α be a root of f (x) modulo q. For which subsets S ⊆ R q it is π α (S) = F q ?
Or, at least, can one determine the conditions for non-smearing, like in the case when α = 1 and S is a set of small vectors in P q ?
Finally, as seen before, polynomials with small order roots modulo q should be avoided. Again, cyclotomic polynomials are safe for attacks built on small order roots, as their roots have maximal order. The problem here is as follows:
Question 5.16. For random polynomials f (x) and random primes q for which f (x) has a root α modulo q, what can one say about the order of α modulo q?
A special instance of this question is this famous open problem:
Problem 5.17. For given a ∈ Z, how often is a a primitive root modulo q as q runs over the primes?
A conjecture by Artin states that a is a primitive root modulo q for infinitely many primes q such that a is not a perfect square or −1 modulo q. Moreover, the conjecture describes the density of such primes.
6. Beyond encryption and some NIST figures 6.1. RLWE Digital Signatures. We focus here in the most recent RLWE digital signature scheme, the GLYPH ([5] 2017), which improves an earlier scheme by Gunyesu,Lyubashevsky and Poppelman (GLP). This and other RLWE-based signatures schemes have the smallest public keys and signature sizes among postquantum digital signature schemes.
A first difference to mention here is that instead of discrete Gaussians, the coefficients of small polynomials are sampled uniformly from {−b, ..., 0, ..., b} with |b| ≪ q. Secondly, the lengths of signatures must not exceed a prescribed parameter n, regardless of the size of the message to sign. To attain this, the scheme uses a hash function H, which takes arbitrary messages to bit strings of length n. Third, the procedure has a sampling rejection step: if the infinity norm of a signature polynomial exceeds a fixed bound, β, that polynomial will be discarded and the signing process starts again. This process will be repeated until the infinity norm of the signature polynomial is less than or equal the bound. Rejection ensures that the output signature is not exploitably correlated with the signer's secret key values. In GLYPH, the bound, β will be (b − k), where k is the number of non-zero coefficients allowed in acceptable polynomials.
Last, the maximum degree of the signature polynomials will be n−1 and therefore have n coefficients. Typical values for n are 512, and 1024. The coefficients of these polynomials will be taken from the field F q where q is an odd prime congruent to 1 mod 4. For n = 1024, GLYPH sets q = 59393, b = 16383 and k = 16. The scheme is as follows: cheap cloud computing and distributed storage have drastically changed how business and individuals process their data and although traditional encryption like AES are very fast, to perform even simple analytics on encrypted data requires either the cloud server to access the secret keys, leading to security concerns or to download the data, decrypt and operate, which is costly. Homomorphic encryption is the solution to this challenge.
Areas where homomorphic encryption has applications include electronic voting systems and processing or computing on encrypted or compressed health, financial or other kinds of sensitive data on external servers like cloud or distributed devices.
Homomorphic and fully homomorphic encryption(FHE) has already been introduced here in Definition 2.5, and Example 2.6 provides an example of non-fully homomorphic encryption scheme. RLWE provides a FHE scheme, as we see next. 1. Key generation: Chose s ∈ R by sampling from a discrete Gaussian such that the probability of the set {0, ±1} φ(m) is close enough to 1.
2. Encryption/Decryption: A plaintext α ∈ R p r is encrypted to E(s, α) = (p 0 , p 1 ) ∈ R q i if and only if p 0 + sp 1 modulo q i equals α + p r ǫ in R with ||ǫ|| < q i /p r for some i ∈ {0, ..., L}.
Observe that adding or multiplying two i-level ciphertexts results in an i + 1-level ciphertext, so computations over level L-ciphertexts are not allowed, as they cannot be decrypted. Several recent refinements to this scheme have been proposed ( [11] ) and the topic is still under research.
Several open-source implementations of homomorphic encryption are available. For instance, HELib, a widely used library from IBM that implements the BGV cryptosystem, SEAL, a Microsoft version, ΛOλ (pronounced LOL), a Haskell library for ring-based lattice cryptography that supports FHE or PALISADE, a general lattice encryption library. it is possible to add new implementations after public review by contacting contact@HomomorphicEncryption.org. In sum, homomorphic encryption is already ripe for mainstream use but the lack of standardisation makes difficult to start using it.
6.3. NIST figures. In 2017, the American National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), opened an open process to solicit, evaluate, and standardize one or more quantum-resistant public-key cryptographic algorithms. In their own words:
The question of when a large-scale quantum computer will be built is a complicated one. While in the past it was less clear that large quantum computers are a physical possibility, many scientists now believe it to be merely a significant engineering challenge. Some engineers even predict that within the next twenty or so years sufficiently large quantum computers will be built to break essentially all public key schemes currently in use. Historically, it has taken almost two decades to deploy our modern public key cryptography infrastructure. Therefore, regardless of whether we can estimate the exact time of the arrival of the quantum computing era, we must begin now to prepare our information security systems to be able to resist quantum computing.
The deadline for submission was November 30, 2017. The total number of submissions (for encryption, key exchange and signatures) was 71. At the time of writing, 14 submissions have been attacked or withdrawn (due to an attack or the finding of a fatal mistake by the authors). Of the remaining 57, some of the proposals (mainly code-based ones) have merged. Taking this into account, 50 proposals remain unbroken. Some of them have been found to have non-fatal statistical attacks, which can be avoided with a right choice of parameters. Now, of these 50 proposals: 9 are code-based, 21 are lattice-based, 2 are hashbased (and both have been found to have non-fatal attacks or there are parameter concerns), 9 are multivariate-based, 1 is a supersingular isogeny Diffie-Hellman (SIDH) key-exchange protocol, which has a potential attack. The remaining 8 submissions are hybrid or are based on problems such as random walks (1), braids (2), Chebychev polynomials (1) or hypercomplex numbers (1).
Finally, in the lattice-based category, 15 are RLWE-based. Of these 15, 2 of them are PLWE-based. For details cf. https://www.safecrypto.eu/pqclounge/
